Evaluating the Availability of an Income-Driven Repayment Plan Under the Two Doctrinal Tests for Undue Hardship by Fisher, Emily R.
St. John's University School of Law 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository 
Bankruptcy Research Library Center for Bankruptcy Studies 
2021 
Evaluating the Availability of an Income-Driven Repayment Plan 
Under the Two Doctrinal Tests for Undue Hardship 
Emily R. Fisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by St. John's University School of Law

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
that, due to the availability of an IDR plan, the non-discharge of a student loan can never 
constitute undue hardship.6 There is no statute or regulation that explicitly requires IDR plans to 
be considered in student loan bankruptcy cases, however, the majority of appellate courts have 
unanimously treated the availability of IDR plans as relevant in assessing undue hardship.7  
This memorandum addresses the relationship between the discharge of student loans in 
bankruptcy upon a finding of undue hardship and the availability of an IDR plan. Part I outlines 
two doctrinal tests used by courts to determine whether the repayment of student loans imposes 
an undue hardship on a debtor. Part II then examines how courts have adapted the tests when a 
debtor is eligible for an IDR plan, and the role eligibility plays in determining undue hardship 
and the dischargeability of student loans. 
I. The Prevailing Standards for Determination of Undue Hardship 
Although Congress created one legal standard for student loan discharge, two tests have 
emerged to determine whether a debtor has proved undue hardship. Nine out of the eleven circuit 
courts use the three-prong Brunner test created by the Second Circuit.8 The Eighth Circuit is the 
only circuit to formally reject the Brunner test by creating the “totality of the circumstances 
test.”9 The First Circuit has declined to adopt either test, but most bankruptcy courts in the First 
 
6 See, e.g., Rutherford v. William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (In re Rutherford), 317 B.R. 865, 877 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 2004). 
7 See Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 2013); Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 
F.3d 882, 883–84 (7th Cir. 2013); Coco v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance (In re Coco), 335 F. App'x 224, 
227–28 (3d Cir. 2009); Roe v. College Access Network (In re Roe), 295 F. App'x 927, 931 (10th Cir. 2008); Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 
433 F.3d 393, 402–03 (4th Cir. 2005). 
8 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987); see also., Oyler 
v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005); Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400; Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys (In re Polleys), 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. 
Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 
F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305–06 
(3d Cir. 1995); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 1993). 
9 See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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Circuit apply the totality of the circumstances test.10 This part outlines the doctrinal structure of 
the two predominant tests for determination of undue hardship: the Brunner test and the “totality 
of the circumstances test.” 
A. The Majority Test: The Brunner Test 
Most courts evaluate undue hardship under the three-prong test established in Brunner v. 
New York State Higher Educ.11 To receive a discharge of student loans under the Brunner test, a 
debtor must establish the following three elements: 
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and 
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her 
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional 
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to 
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the 
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to 
repay the loans.12  
 
Under the first prong of Brunner, the court will evaluate the debtor’s current standard of 
living and determine whether forcing the debtor to repay the student loans will prevent her from 
maintaining a minimal standard of living.13 Generally, maintaining a minimal standard of living 
means a debtor can afford “basic necessities.”14 What qualifies as a basic necessity varies among 
courts. Some courts take a more generous approach and allow expenses for transportation, 
hygiene, and modest recreation.15 Other courts adopt a narrower view and restrict necessities to 
only food, clothing, housing, and medical treatment.16 The debtor doesn’t need to show that 
repayment of the loan would cause the debtor to live at or below the poverty level.17 However, 
 
10 See Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190–91 (1st Cir. 2006). 
11 46 B.R. 752, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). 
12 In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Kuznicki v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kuznicki), 483 B.R. 296, 300–01 (W.D. Pa. 2012). 
16 See Crawley v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Crawley), 460 B.R. 421, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
17 See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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the debtor cannot dismiss their loan obligation simply because repayment would require 
significant personal or financial sacrifices.18 
If the debtor proves their inability to maintain a minimal standard of living, the court 
moves on to the second prong of the Brunner test.19 The second prong requires the debtor to 
demonstrate that additional circumstances exist indicating “that [the debtor’s] state of affairs is 
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loan.”20 A debtor 
must show that extenuating circumstances affect their future earning potential and their ability to 
make payments on the loan.21 These circumstances must be unique or extraordinary and “may 
include, but are not limited to, illness, disability, a lack of useable job skills, or the existence of a 
large number of dependents.”22 Most importantly, a debtor’s additional circumstances must be 
beyond their control and not borne of free choice.23 
If a debtor can prove the second prong of Brunner, the third and final prong of the test is 
an inquiry into whether or not the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the student loans.24 
When a debtor receives a student loan, they become obligated to make a good faith effort to 
repay the loan in full.25 Therefore, a court will evaluate the number of payments a debtor has 
made on the student loan.26 Making some payments can demonstrate good faith, but failure to 
make a payment, standing alone, does not establish a lack of good faith.27 Courts also 
acknowledge that a debtor may not have the funds available to make payments.28 In these 
 
18 Id. at 306. 
19 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2007). 
23 Id. 
24 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
25 See Roberson v. Illinois Student Assistance Comm. (In re Roberson), 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993). 
26 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007). 
27 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004). 
28 Id. 
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circumstances, courts have found a debtor’s efforts to defer the loan or enroll in a payment plan 
sufficient to demonstrate good faith.29 
B. The Minority Test: The Totality of the Circumstances Test 
In adopting the “totality of the circumstances test,” the Eighth Circuit articulated their 
belief that fairness and equity require each undue hardship case to be examined based on the 
unique facts and circumstances surrounding the particular bankruptcy.30 In evaluating the totality 
of the circumstances, bankruptcy courts consider: (1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably 
reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and her dependent’s 
reasonable and necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances 
surrounding the particular bankruptcy case.31 Under this test, if the debtor’s reasonable future 
financial resources will sufficiently cover their student loan debt while still allowing for a 
minimal standard of living, the debt is non-dischargeable.32 Courts give special consideration to 
the debtor’s present employment and financial situation, including assets, expenses, and 
earnings, along with the prospect of future changes, positive or adverse, in the debtor’s financial 
position.33 
The Eighth Circuit believed that requiring bankruptcy courts to adhere to the strict 
parameters of the Brunner test diminished the inherent discretion Congress gave to courts to 
determine undue hardship.34 Use of the totality of the circumstances test has allowed bankruptcy 
courts to consider various factors beyond the presence of excess income over expenses.35 Factors 
such as the effect refusing discharge has on the mental health of the debtor, the physical 
 
29 Id. at 1312. 
30 In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554–55. 
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conditions that impair the debtor’s ability to maintain employment, and a debtor’s good faith 
effort to repay the loan.36 
II. Incorporating an IDR Plan into the Doctrinal Tests for Undue Hardship 
The U.S. Department of Education enacted regulations that allow student loan borrowers 
to enroll in IDR plans.37 IDR plans allow for the adjustment of monthly payments based on the 
income of the student loan debtor.38 Creditors frequently argue that, due to the availability of 
IDR plans, the non-discharge of a student loan can never constitute undue hardship.39 The 
majority of courts reject the argument that IDR plans should preempt judicial determination of 
the dischargeability of student loans.40 Thus, it is important to examine how courts have 
incorporated the availability of an IDR plan under the two doctrinal tests for undue hardship. 
A. Evaluating the Availability of an IDR Plan Under the Brunner Test 
For courts applying the Brunner test, the question arises as to which part of the test to 
evaluate the availability of an IDR plan. The majority of courts have treated IDR as one factor to 
consider in determining whether the debtor has made a good faith effort to repay the loans, thus 
satisfying the third prong of the Brunner test.41 A debtor’s willingness to participate in an IDR 
plan can often demonstrate good faith.42 The majority of courts do not require a debtor to 
participate in an IDR plan to satisfy the good faith requirement, but a debtor’s failure to 
participate in a plan is relevant.43 
 
36 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Reynolds), 303 B.R. 823, 826–27 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 2004); Limkemann v. U.S. Dept. of Educ. (In re Limkemann), 314 B.R. 190, 194–95 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
2004); Faktor v. United States (In re Faktor), 306 B.R. 256, 264 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004). 
37 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)–(e) (2018). 
38 Id. 
39 In re Rutherford, 317 B.R. at 877. 
40 See, e.g., Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 2013). 
41 See, e.g., Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490, 500 n.7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2002). 
42 See Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1310. 
43 See In re Birrane, 287 B.R. at 500 n.7. 
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Evaluating the availability of an IDR plan under the third prong of the Brunner test, the 
bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas granted a discharge of student loan debt 
despite a debtor’s failure to enroll in an IDR plan.44 The court rejected the argument that failure 
to participate in an IDR plan is per se bad faith.45 Even though the debtor’s IDR plan would have 
resulted in a zero-dollar payment plan, the court determined that a refusal to discharge student 
loans would still result in an undue hardship on the debtor and her dependents.46 While failure to 
enroll in an IDR plan weighed against a finding of good faith, it did not outweigh other factors, 
such as the debtor’s continuous efforts to seek deferment and forbearance of her loans.47 
A minority of courts will consider the availability of the IDR plan under the second prong 
of the Brunner test, whether additional circumstances exist indicating that a debtor’s financial 
condition is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period.48 Taking this 
approach, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas denied a debtor discharge of 
her student loans.49 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the availability of an IDR plan 
allowing the debtor to make income-contingent monthly payments and canceling her loans after 
twenty-five years.50 For this reason, the court found that the debtor’s situation was unlikely to 
persist throughout the foreseeable future, thus failing the second part of the Brunner test.51 
Adopting a similar approach, an Indiana bankruptcy court considered the availability of 
an IDR plan under both the second and third prongs of the Brunner test.52 In this case, a debtor’s 
 
44 See Trejo v. Navient (In re Trejo), 17-42439-MXM-7, 2020 WL 1884444, at *10 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 
2020). 
45 Id. at *9. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
49 See Hollins v. U.S. Dept. of Educ. (In re Hollins), 286 B.R. 310, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See Archibald v. United States (In re Archibald), 280 B.R. 222, 227–28 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2002). 
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nonparticipation in an IDR plan weighed against a finding of good faith.53 The debtor’s ability to 
consolidate her loans over twenty-five years under the IDR plan prevented a showing of 
“certainty of hopelessness,” the standard employed by the Seventh Circuit under the second part 
of Brunner.54 Since the debtor could afford monthly payments under the IDR plan, the court 
concluded this was a practical alternative to discharge.55 
Finally, a minority of courts address the availability of an IDR under the first prong of the 
Brunner test, whether the debtor can maintain a minimal standard of living.56 Since payments 
under an IDR plan are based on a debtor’s income, courts taking this approach often reason that 
the monthly payments are unlikely to prevent a debtor from maintaining a minimal standard of 
living.57 This conclusion is common when a debtor’s enrollment in an IDR plan would result in a 
zero-dollar monthly payment.58 However, other courts have recognized that the formula for 
determining monthly payments is strictly based on income and does not account for expenses 
arising from dependents or medical conditions.59 Thus, if a debtor cannot afford the payments, 






53 Id. at 229. 
54 Id. at 228–29. 
55 Id. 
56 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
57 See e.g., Thomsen v. Dept. of Educ. (In re Thomsen), 234 B.R. 506, 512 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999). 
58 See e.g., Thoms v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Thoms), 257 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
59 See, e.g., McLaney v. Ky. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re McLaney), 375 B.R. 666, 671–72, 678 (M.D. Ala. 
2007). 
60 See e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Durrani (In re Durrani), 311 B.R. 496, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004), aff'd, 
320 B.R. 357 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
B. Evaluating the Availability of an IDR Plan Under the Totality of the 
Circumstances Test 
 
When applying the totality of the circumstances test, the majority of courts have rejected 
a per se rule that participation in an IDR plan is required to reach a finding of undue hardship.61 
Courts note that treating the availability of an IDR plan as outcome determinative would 
effectively override the individualized determination of undue hardship mandated by Congress in 
§ 523(a)(8).62 Instead, under the totality of the circumstances test, the availability of an IDR plan 
is one factor to consider in evaluating the totality of a debtor’s circumstances.63 
In Lee v. Regions Bank Student Loans, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of 
the Eighth Circuit upheld a discharge of the debtor’s student loans.64 The debtor, a single mother 
of two children, owed over $47,000 in student loans and received no child support from her ex-
husband.65 The bankruptcy court determined that under an IDR plan, the debtor could not afford 
the monthly payments without causing undue hardship on herself and her dependents.66 In this 
case, the creditors appealed, arguing the bankruptcy court had failed to consider the IDR plan’s 
availability adequately.67 Affirming the discharge, the Eighth Circuit held that under the totality 
of the circumstances analysis, the availability of an IDR plan should not be given undue 
weight.68 The court explained that while an IDR plan may provide temporary relief, it does not 
 
61 See In re Long, 322 F.3d at 552. 
62 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(8) (2018). 
63 See In re Long, 322 F.3d at 552. 
64 See Lee v. Regions Bank Student Loans (In re Lee), 352 B.R. 91, 96–97 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). 
65 In re Lee, 345 B.R. 911, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2006). 
66 Id. at 914, 919. 
67 In re Lee, 352 B.R. at 91. 
68 Id. at 97. 
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offer a fresh start.69 Aspects of an IDR plan such as negative amortization and a potentially 
significant tax bill are inimical to the goal of bankruptcy.70 
Availability of an IDR plan becomes more relevant to a totality of the circumstances 
analysis when the size of the debtor’s student loan debt is the primary basis for claiming undue 
hardship.71 In Jesperson, the Eighth Circuit reversed a finding of undue hardship entitling a 
debtor to a discharge of more than $350,000 in student loans.72 In this case, the debtor had never 
made any payments on the loans despite a monthly surplus of $900 in income.73 Given the 
debtor’s earning potential and lack of substantial obligations to dependents or mental or physical 
impairments, the court concluded the only possible basis for granting an undue hardship 
discharge would be the “sheer magnitude of his student loan debts.”74 Because the debtor had an 
income surplus sufficient to satisfy the IDR plan’s monthly payment, the Eighth Circuit reversed 
the discharge.75 The majority opinion in Jesperson does not stand for the proposition that a 
debtor’s eligibility for an IDR plan automatically precludes an undue hardship discharge.76 
Rather, a debtor with surplus income sufficient to satisfy the monthly payment required under an 
IDR plan is not entitled to a discharge.77 
Conclusion 
When an IDR plan is available, creditors frequently argue that excepting a student loan 
from discharge can never constitute an undue hardship. However, most bankruptcy courts have 




71 See Educ. Credit Management Corp v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2009). 
72 571 F.3d at 779. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 780–81. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 786–90. 
77 Id. 
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bankruptcy. Instead, courts continue to make determinations of undue hardship, treating the 
availability of IDR as one factor in their analysis. When applying the Brunner test or the totality 
of the circumstances test, courts typically focus on whether the IDR plan offers the debtor a 
viable choice for repayment without causing undue hardship. 
